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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Great Charter is often portrayed as the source of English liberties: 
a medieval document which projected its beneficent light forward over 
eight centuries and which, while representing the triumph of barons over 
monarch, brought to birth principles which had equal resonance for an age 
of representative governance and universal suffrage. 
Such portrayal is naturally and explicably depicted in brighter colours 
in this its 800
th
 anniversary with celebrations, exhibitions, conferences, a 
new and scholarly book co-authored by none other than the recently 
retired Lord Chief Justice, the aptly named Lord Judge,
1
 and a no less 
scholarly but more sardonic one by the historian and Television pundit 
David Starkey
2
 and last but not least, these lectures under the auspices of 
the University of Buckingham. 
I am particularly happy to be invited to give the first of these lectures 
since it enables me to discharge my obligation as a Visiting Professor 
which, I regret, that I have hitherto honoured only in the way of the 
Oxford don who, when asked during a mid-twentieth century inquiry into 
the governance of the University about his teaching duties, replied ―I have 
to give an annual lecture – but not, you understand, every year‖.  
 
THE SUMPTION THESIS 
 
In his iridescent address to the Friends of the British Library ―Magna 
Carta then and now‖,3 Lord Sumption, probably the most gifted lawyer, 
                                                     

 Blackstone Chambers.Visiting Professor of Law Visiting Professorial Lecture 
delivered at the University of Buckingham 29
th
 April 2015 to mark the 800
th
 
Anniversary of the signing of Magna Carta. 
1 Anthony Arlidge and Igor Judge, Magna Carta Uncovered (Hart 2015). 
2 David Starkey, Magna Carta: The True Story Behind the Charter (Hodder and 
Stoughton 2015). 
3
 Lord Sumption, ‗Magna Carta then and now‘ (Address to Friends of the British 
Library 9 March 2015). 
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and certainly the most gifted historian in the Supreme Court, exercised an 
erudite iconoclasm to deride the claims of those who saw the charter as 
the foundation stone of democratic government and the parent of the rule 
of law as ―high minded tosh‖. 
Following in the august footsteps of Professor (and later Sir) John 
Holt whose study was published on the 750
th
 anniversary of the Charters 
sealing,
4
 he made the irrefutable point that, like any legal instrument, the 
Magna Carta had to be understood in its historical context. The baronage 
who compelled King John to submit to their demands at Runnymede were 
doing no more than seeking to enforce on him ―conventions which were 
profoundly traditional and obligations which he and his predecessors had 
acknowledged for more than a century‖.5 They were concerned more 
about matters which touched on their finances and standing than about 
infant constitutional principle. 
It was lawyers of later epochs who, as Lord Sumption demonstrated, 
put a halo around Magna Carta; Sir Edward Coke who defended the 
Courts against royal interference and was, as a result of his pains, 
dismissed from the high office of Chief Justice of the Kings Bench by 
James I, used the years of his enforced retirement to seek ideological 
revenge on the Stuart monarchy and declared ―Magna Carta is such a 
fellow that he will have no sovereign‖.6 (Though the charter in Latin is 
female, Coke‘s epigram reflects a gender bias current then and indeed for 
several subsequent centuries). 
Maitland, the doyen of English legal historians, at the turn of the last 
century described Magna Carta as ―the nearest approach to an 
unrepealable fundamental statute that England ever had‖,7 though many of 
its provisions had already been repealed, and, as I shall explain later, only 
a handful have survived a still later legislative cull. 
 
A CASE-CENTRIC APPROACH 
 
Given the plurality of ways in which others, like Lord Sumption 
himself, far more eminent and knowledgeable than I, have expatiated on 
the larger themes whether as believers or belittlers, I thought I would 
select a smaller and distinct topic: paint a miniature rather than a fresco 
and consider whether and, if so, how it has continued to impact directly on 
                                                     
4 J C Holt, Magna Carta (CUP 1965). 
5
 Sumption (n 3). 
6 During the parliamentary debates on the Petition of Right. 
7 Frederick Pollock and Frederic Maitland, History of English law (Vol I i. i 73). 
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the domestic jurisprudence of this country since the start of the twentieth 
century. 
I say domestic because paradoxically Magna Carta has been more 
influential in the courts of the USA than in the courts of the (previously) 
mother country. Lord Sumption states ―In 1991 it was calculated that 
Magna Carta had been cited in more than 900 decisions of state and 
federal courts to date‖ adding sardonically ―generally in support of 
propositions that would not have been recognised by the barons at 
Runnymede‖8 though I suspect that even the qualification ―generally‖ is 
itself over generous. 
By contrast, by his calculation Magna Carta has been cited in no more 
than 170 judgments of the Superior Courts in England since 1900. My 
search engine Westlaw actually bought up 171 cases, which makes 
somewhat modest the assertion in Halsbury‘s Statutes that is has been 
―more than once referred to in the law reports‖.9 I can honourably claim to 
have considered all 171 of them,
10
 but once I probed beneath the surface 
of these statistics it appeared that some such references were to 
commentaries on the cases rather than dicta in them,
11
 and several others 
were to the same case but at different level of the judicial hierarchy, and 
some even to the same case at the same level.
12
 
Yet other references were simply to a case name: there is an otherwise 
unmemorable personal injury case called Walton v Magna Carta Polo;
13
 
to a Magna Carta lecture delivered by Lord Falconer,
14
 the former Lord 
Chancellor, to legal metaphor: the Companies Act 1862 was described by 
Sir Francis Palmer as ―the Magna Carta of Co-operative enterprise.‖15 A 
judgment of Lord Mansfield that the Crown could not levy taxes in the 
island of Grenada after its capture from the French was described as ―the 
                                                     
8
 Sumption (n 3). 
9
 Halsbury’s Statutes (4th edn, 2013) 81. 
10
 With the invaluable assistance of Elaine Wintle our Chambers information 
officer. 
11
 For example Roger Smith Magistrate, Magna Carta A Living Will. 2014 70(6) 
p 28-29. 
12
 R (Mohammed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
[2010] EWCA Civ 65, [2011] QB 218. 
13
 [2000] CLY 1694. 
14
 R (on the application of Al Rawi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs [2008] QB 289. 
15
 Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) [2015] EWCA 
Civ 485. 
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Magna Carta of the Colonies‖;16 its constituent Act was described as ―the 
Magna Carta of the Manchester Ship Canal Co‖,17 to Parliamentary 
statements themselves not always accurate,
18
 and allusions in cases in the 
European Court of Human Rights where the Magna Carta was mentioned 
by way of embellishment of the narrative or analysis
19
 but, for obvious 
reasons, not critical to the result since that Court‘s jurisdiction is founded 
in and bounded by the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Finally there are gratuitous judicial mentions of academic articles 
dealing with aspects of Magna Carta.
20
 In a case on whether the west 
beach at Newhaven could be registered as a village green under the 
Commons Act 2006 Lord Carnwath, in discussing public rights of 
recreation over the foreshore made use of an article in the Yale Law 
Journal in which ―The author traced the history of the law from its Roman 
roots through Magna Carta to the more modern law in England and 
America‖.21 In R v B22 the Court had to consider whether in a trial of 
several defendants for sexual abuse of children it was open to the Judge to 
try together those who were fit to plead and those who were not. The 
decision turned on the meaning and effect of section 11(4) of the Juries 
Act 1974 but Thomas LJ wrapped himself in scholarly garb by referring to 
an article by Professor Oldham on Anglo-American Special Juries.
23
 
The lesson is, put not your trust in search engines: they can 
accumulate but they cannot differentiate. There was much chaff and little 
wheat but I shall nonetheless do my best to bake it into something 
nutritious for your consumption. Oddly the graph of references in the 
cases, reported and unreported, has curved upwards in the last few years 
                                                     
16
 Woolwich Equitable Building Society v IRC [1993] AC 70 (HL) 116 (Lord 
Goff). The case was Campbell v Hall (1774)1 Cowp 204. 
17
 The Calgarth (1927) 93 (CA). 
18
 R (Nikonovs) v Governor of Brixton Prison [2005] EWHC 2405, [2006] 1 
WLR 1518 where the issue was whether the Extradition Act 2003 had overridden 
habeas corpus and Scott Baker LJ at (19) quoted Baroness Scotland saying in the 
House of Lords debate ‗Habeas corpus as we know and love it which was given 
birth to by Magna Carta remains‘. Magna Carta was not the parent of habeas 
corpus. See further below some conflicting dicta on the point.  
19
 For example Case 3455/05 A v United Kingdom [2009] ECHR, Case 7397/01  
Kyprianou v Cyprus [2005] ECHR 873,  Case 34044/96 Streletz v Germany 
[2001] ECHR. 
20
 See below. 
21
 R (on the application of Newhaven Port and Properties Ltd) v East Sussex CC 
[2015] UKSC 7, [2015] 2 WLR 601, 124. 
22
 [2008] EWCA Crim 1997, [2009] 1 WLR 1545. 
23
 Ibid [23]. 
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but, I suspect, through coincidence rather than in anticipation of this 
anniversary. 
 
A STATUTE SURVIVING AND SPEAKING 
 
Magna Carta still features in Halsbury‘s Statutes in the volume on 
Constitutional Law
24
 although pride of place in terms of antiquity in taken 
by the Statute of Westminster 1275, if only because the version of Magna 
Carta in that classic and comprehensive summary of English law is that 
confirmed in 1297 by Edward I.  
The four clauses which survive from the nine still standing on the 
statute book in Professor Holt‘s time25 include two which are little known, 
those which protect the privileges of the Church,
26
 and those which 
protect the privileges of the City of London,
27
 the church and the city 
being in 1215 in the barons camp.  The remaining two have far greater 
resonance: 
 
Clause 39 which provides: 
 
―No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed 
or exiled or any in way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, 
except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the 
land.‖ 
 
And Clause 40 which provides: 
 
―To no-one will we sell, to no-one will we deny or delay right or 
justice.‖28 
 
I say four, although in Halsbury, which as I said uses the 1297 update, 
not the 1215 text, amalgamates clauses 39 and 40 into a single clause 29, 
provoking the same mild irritation in the reader as do the references in the 
post Lisbon version of the Treaty of European Union in which key articles 
have been renumbered but, and it is some consolation, then carry the 
                                                     
24
 Halsbury’s Statutes (n 9) vol 10, para 53 although in Swaffer v Mulcahy [1934] 
1 KB 608 (KB) it was noted ‗Neither Magna Carta nor the Statute of Westminster 
the First was on the statute roll.‘ 
25
 Holt (n 4) 1. 
26
 Magna Carta 1215 (9 Hen 3), clause 1. 
27
 Ibid, clause 13. 
28
 Both were originally Clause 29. 
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legend ―ex Article‖: an aid to understanding not conceived of by the 
thirteenth century draftsman. 
Judges in their judgments have tendered to meander between the two 
versions, but I will be faithful to the earlier text. 
The first two, guarantees to church and city, survived, according to 
Professor Holt, ―because they were harmless confirmations of rights and 
privileges conveyed by other instruments‖29and have required almost30 no 
modern judicial exegesis, though one may wonder whether in a multi faith 
Britain the Church‘s special rights will remain unchallenged. 
The third and fourth are the jewels in the crown of Magna Carta and 
the source of most of the recent judicial dicta. I shall return to that case 
law shortly, but make this prefatory comment that the introductory 
reference to freemen (but not villeins) as beneficiaries of the right in 
Clause 39 confirms that it was not intended by the barons to be enjoyed by 
hoi polloi or the plebs, the toxic word used, according at any rate to Mr 
Justice Mitting, by former Cabinet Minister Andrew Mitchell to the 
Downing Street policeman. 
For Magna Carta to play any role in modern jurisprudence at all, it has 
to be classified as an always speaking statute, a phrase popularised by 
Lord Steyn to indicate that statute should be given its current, not simply 
its historic meaning,
31
 an approach which would be disliked by a 
                                                     
29 Ditto. 
30
 In my lecture I said ‗no‘ without the qualification. But on the very same day 
the Court of Appeal handed down its judgment in Sharpe v Bishop of Worcester 
[2015] EWCA Civ 399 about whether a parish rector was an employee or worker 
so as to qualify for rights under modern employment legislation. Lady Justice 
Arden at [110] surmised that the article embraced ‗freedom of thought and 
conscience for individual incumbents free from interference by parishioners or 
the church hierarchy‘ but went no further since no reliance had been placed on it 
by the rectors‘ counsel. 
31
 See for example R v Ireland [1998] AC 147 (HL) 158 (Lord Steyn). 
Bearing in mind that statutes are usually intended to operate for many years it 
would be most inconvenient if courts could never rely in difficult cases on the 
current meaning of statutes. Recognising the problem Lord Thring, the great 
Victorian draftsman of the second half of the last century, exhorted draftsmen to 
draft so that ‗an act of parliament should be deemed to be always speaking:‘ 
Thring, Practical Legislation, (London 1902) 83. In cases where the problem 
arises it is a matter of interpretation whether a court must search for the historical 
or original meaning of a statute or whether it is free to apply the current meaning 
of the statute to present day conditions. Statutes dealing with a particular 
grievance or problem may sometimes require to be historically interpreted; but 
the drafting technique of Lord Thring and his successors have brought about the 
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transatlantic originalist like Justice Scalia of the United States Supreme 
Court to whom the US Constitution means what it meant when drafted, no 
more, if no less.  
 
OBSOLETE PROVISIONS 
 
Whatever approach to interpretation is used, many of the rights 
guaranteed or obligations imposed in Magna Carta have no scope for 
application in the todays world. We know no more of scutage;
32
 there are 
multiple and more ingenious modern ways to tax us. Novel dissessin, mort 
d‘ancestor, darrein presentment and the writ of praecipe33 34 have vanished 
from our legal lexicon. We have scant concern with mortmain,
35
 or 
subinfeudination.
36
 No one peer, commoner or cleric is at risk of 
amercement.
37
 The fate of the relations and followers of Gerard d‘Athee38 
is not at the apex of the political agenda. 
Developing and elaborate legislation for consumer protection has 
made obsolete the Charter‘s insistence on uniform measures of wine, ale, 
corn and cloth throughout the Kingdom;
39
 While justices, constables, 
sheriffs and bailiffs (or their analogous contemporary officials) are still 
expected ,as Clause 45 enjoins, to ―know the law of the land and mean to 
observe it well‖40 there are rules and regulations, training and discipline 
rather than mere general exhortation to the monarch to ensure the 
continuation of such happy state of affairs. 
Nor is this obsolete character a cause for unalloyed alarm. Some of the 
Charters articles are the antithesis of emancipatory. At least two are anti-
Semitic,
41
 in particular setting limits to Jewish activities as moneylenders; 
                                                                                                                        
situation that statutes will generally be found to be of the ‗always speaking‘ 
variety. 
32 Magna Carta (n 26), clause 12. 
33 Ibid, clause 18. 
34 Ibid, clause 34. 
35 See discussion in Attorney General v Parsons [1956] AC 421 (HL) and 
Morelle v Wakeling [1955] 2 QB 379 (QB). 
36
 The subject of Re Holliday [1922] 2 Ch 698 (Ch). 
37 Magna Carta (n 26), clauses 20-22. 
38 Ibid, clause 50. 
39 Ibid, clause 35. 
40 Ibid, clause 45. 
41 Magna Carta (n 26), clauses 10 and 11: a point made in a letter to The Times of 
4
th
 April 2015 by Zaki Cooper Trustee of the Council of Christians and Jews. 
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and the provision in Clause 45 ―no one shall be taken or imprisoned upon 
the appeal of a woman for the death of anyone except her husband‖,42 fall 
short of the highest feminist ideals, even, I stress, taking account of the 
qualification at the end of the sentence.  
 
ANCIENT RIGHTS 
 
Those articles that have perished more slowly en route to today are 
certainly redolent with the flavour of their times. The first case in the 
twentieth century, and the only one which predates, to the best of my 
researches, the First World War, in which Magna Carta was referred to is 
Williams v Thomas.
43
 It involved the claims of a widow of an intestate 
who had himself died in 1885 to an assignment of dower and an account 
of rent and profits from 1905. On that date, the land from which she had 
hitherto received since her late husband‘s death a third of the rents from 
the co heiresses, the defendants to the suit, suddenly became available for 
highly profitable development similar to the familiar contemporary 
situation when a farmer receives planning permission to build a housing 
estate on his fields. The Master of the Rolls considered the position of the 
doweress both in law and in equity, and observed: ―At law the doweress 
was entitled under Magna Carta to have an assignment of dower by metes 
and bounds within forty days after her husband‘s death.‖44 Equity 
provided no sufficient relaxation of such strict time limits and the 
widow‘s claim was held barred on account of laches or delay.  
Some of the cases touch on the collision not of private against private 
but of private against ancient public rights. Mr Loose, lessee of the Lords 
of the Manor of Mecham and Snettisham argued that pursuant to his lease 
he had a right which trumped the public‘s right to fish in tidal waters. 
Relying on the presumption of a lost medieval grant from the Crown, 
which had to be a date prior to 1189, given that amongst other matters, as 
Lord Justice Moore-Bick recollected ―Magna Carta prohibited the creation 
of new private fisheries‖45 so curtailing what would otherwise have been 
the Crown‘s prerogative power to exclude the public right. 
                                                     
42 Ibid, clause 54. 
43 [1909] 1 Ch 713 (Ch). 
44 Ibid 720 (Cozens-Hardy MR) referring to Clause 7 of the Magna Carta 
(repealed). See also the mention in National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth 
[1965] AC 1175 (HL). 
45 Loose v Lynn Shellfish Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 846, [2015] 2 WLR 643 [124]. 
See also Loose v Castleton [1981] 41 P&CR 19 (CA). 
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The same starting point featured in the thoroughly modern context of 
the Government‘s fisheries policy and its compatibility with the laws of 
the European Union and European Convention on Human Rights where 
the Judge recorded ―Interveners submissions began with the proposition 
that fish are a public resource, recognised as such as long ago as Magna 
Carta.‖46 
An analogous right was the public right of navigation in tidal waters 
which formed the backcloth to a dispute between Mr Moore and the 
British Waterways Board
47
 where Hildyard J commented ―The claimant 
provided an impressive historical review of the genesis of these rights 
back past the Magna Carta which confirmed such rights‖.48 Unfortunately 
this erudition did not save the day for Mr Moore because the issue was 
whether the spot where he wished to berth his craft was or was not in tidal 
waters and the finding of fact on that critical point was against him. 
Mr Roberts was another enthusiast for ancient rights. On acquiring the 
title to the manor and suburbs of St David‘s, he claimed as successor in 
title to the eponymous Bishops to be entitled to rights in the foreshore 
granted to them by the Crown. In holding that his only right in the 
foreshore was as to wreck, that is to say to salvage any beached ships, 
Lewison J observed, again, that ―the creation of a several fishery was 
prohibited by Magna Carta‖.49 
An avid collector of titles as well as a serial litigant, the same Mr 
Roberts, on becoming Lord Marcher of Trellench claimed part of the fee 
simple in the banks of the Severn estuary. The Crown relied by way of 
defence on adverse possession. Mummery LJ agreed that, among other 
legal materials cited, Magna Carta provided ―no man shall be disseised of 
                                                     
46 United Kingdom Association of Fish Producers Organisations v Secretary of 
State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2013] EWHC 1959, [2013] 
All ER (D) 181 (Jul) (Cranston J). See further on fishing rights Isle of Anglesey 
CC v Welsh Ministers [2009] EWCA Civ 94, [2010] QB 163, 35 (Carnwath LJ) 
where the challenge was to an order giving exclusive rights of oyster and mussel 
fishing. Anderson v Alnwick DC [1993] 1 WLR 156 (CA), Nicholls v Ely Beet 
Sugar Factory no 1 [1931] 2 Ch 84 (Ch). 
47 Moore v  British Waterways Board [2012] EWHC 182, [2012] 1 WLR 3289. 
48 Ibid [27].  See also A-G ex Yorkshire Derwent Trust v Brotherton [1990] Ch 
136 (Ch). 
49 Crown Estates Commissioners v Roberts [2008] EWHC 1302, [2008] 4 All ER 
828 .See too Alfred F Beckett Ltd v Lyons [1967] Ch 449 (CA): ‗The only public 
rights in the foreshore which have been recognised by the law since Magna Carta 
are those of navigation, fishing and possibly some rights ancillary thereto...‘ Irish 
Society v Harold [1912] AC 287. 
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his freehold…but by the law of the land‖ but reasoned that ―this could not 
limit the ability of the Crown to rely on statutes of limitation which were 
not then but are now part of the law of the land‖.50 
Such cases and the clauses on which they were based are essentially of 
antiquarian interest, so I pass from the periphery to the core of the 
Charter, and those clauses inherently capable of adaption. 
Clauses 39 and 40 indeed deal with issues of potential contemporary 
and general relevance. 
 
DENIAL OF JUSTICE  
 
Magna Carta guarantees the provision of justice to all the Kings 
subjects: whether it entitled foreigners to sue in the Kings courts was 
considered but left open in a case where Irish rebels claimed return of 
money seized from them,
51
 but, to whomever it is owed, the right to 
justice in Clause 39 is not unqualified. 
In R v Bracknell ex p Griffiths
52
 Lord Simon said
53
 ―although Magna 
Carta provided that to no man should justice be delayed or denied, it is not 
unparalleled for the legislature to constitute such lets or hindrances‖. 
Hence, by way of material example, the statutory requirement for mental 
patients to obtain the leave of the court to bring proceedings
54
 or the 
restraints on vexatious litigants. 
And statute is not the only source of such qualification. In Rost v 
Edwards
55
 an MP sought to bring proceedings for libel against the 
newspaper which alleged that he had improperly disclosed confidential 
information obtained in his capacity as a member of the Commons select 
committee on energy and that, as a result, he had lost his post as well as 
his good name. He wished to adduce in support of his claim evidence 
about matters internal to Parliament such as the requirements of the MPs‘ 
register of interests. The question was whether this was prevented as 
involving the questioning of proceedings in Parliament prohibited by the 
Bill of Rights 1689. Mr Justice Popplewell ruled in Mr Rost‘s favour 
                                                     
50 Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd [2007] EWHC 513, [2008] Ch 439 [45]. 
51 Johstone v Pedlar [1921] 2 AC 262 (HL). Lord Sumner said that ‗an historical 
inquiry would be of great interest but I doubt if all the necessary material is yet 
available‘, 291. 
52 [1976] AC 314 (HL). 
53 Ibid, 329. 
54 Applied Winch v Jones [1986] QB 296 (CA) 302 (Donaldson MR). 
55 [1990] 2 QB 460 (QB). 
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stating, with reference to Magna Carta ―It is important to recognise that 
there is a no less important principle that the citizens of this country 
should have free and unrestrained access to the courts of the land‖ but 
adding, ―subject to the rules of Court‖.56 I would add subject too to such 
substantive rules as those of parliamentary privilege which, on the facts of 
that case, the learned judge had found not to stretch as far as the 
newspaper would have wished. 
Other principles can collide with and override the right not to be 
denied justice. 
In De Crittenden v Bayliss (deceased)
57
 the claimant had been cheated 
out of his share of partnership monies by the late Mr Bayliss. He brought 
a claim in debt, and then, only later, sought to trace the money owed to 
him into property purchased by Mr Bayliss with it. Unfortunately it was 
by then too late  
Sir Christopher Staughton said: 
 
―37…There is a Latin maxim — Interest res publicae ut sit finis 
litium — it is in the interest of the state that there be an end of 
lawsuits. That is in my opinion a sound principle, but it is not the 
whole story. The state has an obligation to provide the apparatus 
of civil litigation so that citizens may make use of it‖. That can be 
found in Magna Carta. Nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut 
differemus — to no one will we sell or deny or delay right and 
justice. Our task is to hold the balance between those principles.‖  
 
―38… It is regrettable but unavoidable that we have to decide this 
appeal against Mr de Crittenden. It may well be that pure justice 
would require us to entertain the further claims that he wishes to 
put forward; but, a litigant is obliged to bring forward the whole of 
his claim at one time. That is not always an absolute rule, but here 
the effect of embarking on Mr De Crittenden‘s further claim 
would require an extensive inquiry which would be difficult or 
even impossible now to conduct.‖58 
 
Indeed, paradoxically, the principle that justice should not be denied 
can be trumped by the principle that justice should not be delayed. In 
                                                     
56 Ibid 724. 
57 [2005] EWCA Civ 1425. 
58
 Ibid. 
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Allen v MacAlpine
59
 where Lord Denning MR developed the concept that 
cases could be struck out on grounds of want of prosecution even if 
brought within the statutory limitation period, he summarily dismissed an 
argument that this involved a denial of justice contrary to Magna Carta 
with the succinct sentence, ―the delay of justice is the denial of justice‖.60 
Rules as to rights of audience can also limit indirectly the means of 
access, to which itself, individuals have a prima facie entitlement.
61
 Dr 
Pelling a maths lecturer had a lucrative side line occupation as a 
professional and paid McKenzie friend in family law disputes.
62
  
 The issue which confronted the Court was whether Dr Pelling was 
entitled to act in custody proceeding which were held not in public but in 
chambers. Dr Pelling argued, noted Otton J, that ―there was now a right to 
a McKenzie friend in proceedings in Chambers and for the friend so to act 
once appointed by the litigant. (He) developed this line of argument by 
reference to Magna Carta with an appropriate citation‖.63 
Otton J nonetheless held that the requirement for Dr Pelling to obtain 
leave of the court before so acting ―cannot be said to be in violation of 
rights enshrined in Magna Carta‖,64 a proposition he thought so obvious 
that he did not take time to explain it. The Court of Appeal upheld his 
decision, without reference to Magna Carta, but confirmed that the 
discretion which the judge hearing the custody dispute undoubtedly 
enjoyed should be exercised by reference to the ―interests of the litigant in 
person‖ not those of Dr Pelling65 which, I suspect rightly, they may have 
thought were in the forefront of Dr Pelling‘s concerns. 
Magna Carta enjoins the state not to deny access; but it does not 
necessarily require it to provide access. Mr Wynne, a prisoner, submitted 
that the State was obliged to provide him with funds to cover his expenses 
of travelling to Court, even where, as was the case, his seemingly perverse 
claim was against the state
66
 for failure to give him Category A status so 
                                                     
59 [1968] 2 QB 229 (CA). 
60 Ibid 245, applied in Barratt Manchester Ltd v Bolton MBC [1998] 1 WLR 
1003 (CA) 1010. 
61 R v Bow County Court ex p Pelling [1999] 1 WLR 1807 (CA). 
62
 McKenzie friends are persons, who though not legally qualified, are permitted 
by the Courts to assist litigants in person. 
63 ex p Pelling (n 61) 1814. 
64 Ibid 1815. 
65 Ibid 1827. 
66 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Wynne [1993] 1 WLR 
115 (HL). 
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that he could be incarcerated in a high security prison. I represented the 
Secretary of State. James Munby, now President of the Family Division, 
representing the prisoner, had three strings to his bow the third of which 
was Magna Carta. The Court of Appeal held that Mr Wynne was entitled 
to come to court, but should pay for the privilege. The House of Lords 
found the issue to be moot, because the prisoner was required to apply for 
such funding and had not done so, and although Wynne‘s was a test case 
declined to overrule the Court of Appeal, or for that matter to uphold it.
67
 
 
DEFERMENT OF JUSTICE 
 
While delays of the kind described so vividly in Charles Dickens 
classic ―Bleak House‖ are no longer, in the age of the overriding objective 
of the Civil Procedure rules and the conversion of judge from referee into 
case manager, tolerable, or indeed tolerated, delays in dispute resolution 
can still regrettably occur in Her Majesty‘s Courts. 
In Grahame Henry Bond v Dunster Properties Limited
68
 Lady Justice 
Arden started her judgment in this way under the heading: 
 
―Everyone is entitled to a hearing…within a reasonable time‖.  
 
1. The thrust of the appeal is against the Judge‘s findings of 
fact. A major cause of complaint is that the Judge did not hand 
down judgment until some 22 months after the conclusion of the 
hearing and that as one result his findings of fact are against the 
weight of the evidence. This extraordinary delay clearly called for 
an apology and, if any existed, an explanation of the mitigating 
circumstances. However, so far as we are aware, there was none. 
Litigation is stressful for the parties, sometimes because they are 
members of the same family and sometimes because the 
transactions are commercial in nature and their outcome has 
implications for other transactions that the parties or others need to 
carry out. Life has to go on before, during and after litigation. In 
some cases, a delay in producing a judgment may prevent the 
parties from reaping any benefit from the litigation at all. 
Unfortunately, this case involves both the elements of close family 
relations and of commercial transactions. Irrespective of the 
respective merits of the appeal, this court has no reservation in 
                                                     
67
 See on the same subject an earlier case Becker v the Home Office [1972] 2 QB 
407 (CA) where Magna Carta was relied on without effect (412G). 
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expressing its sympathies for the parties as a result of the length of 
time they had to wait for this judgment. We would include others 
involved in the litigation such as the witnesses and the 
professional advisers. Delays of this order are lamentable and 
unacceptable…. 
3. The opening cross-heading of this judgment is a quotation 
from article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
which has been given protection under domestic law by the 
Human Rights Act 1998. A ―hearing‖ includes the delivery of 
judgment. The right is not a new one or one which is alien to the 
common law. Clause 40 of Magna Carta provides: ―To no one will 
we … delay… justice‖. 
 
Of course the unfortunate judge, the object of this criticism, was a 
mere tyro in the art of delay compared with Lord Eldon, the long serving 
Lord Chancellor of the nineteenth centuries, the delays of some of whose 
judgments were measured in years, not months or weeks. 
It is not only claimants who are entitled to a hearing and judgment 
without undue delay. In R (Casey) v Restormel BC,
69
 a case about a 
pregnant teenager living in a car whom the local authority had refused to 
house on the ground that she was intentionally homeless Munby J 
delivered a thunderous peroration. 
 
―27. When this matter was before me on 3 October 2007 I 
expressed myself in strong terms on the subject of the delay, 
actual or threatened, to which the defendant had been subjected by 
the court. 
28. The delay, I said, was simply indefensible. I referred to Magna 
Carta, expressing the view that the potential delay here amounted 
to a denial of justice in the sense in which that phrase is used in 
Magna Carta…The opportunity for subsequent reflection gives me 
no reason to moderate my views.‖  
 
Which he then expressed over ten trenchant paragraphs ending: 
 
―33. Hard pressed local and other public authorities should not be 
prejudiced, income tax, corporation tax and council tax payers and 
rate-payers should not be financially disadvantaged, and other 
more deserving claimants seeking recourse to over-stretched 
public resources should not be prejudiced, because of delays in the 
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Royal Courts of Justice. It is fashionable nowadays in some circles 
to decry as no longer relevant anything more than twenty or thirty 
years old. But there are some principles that ring down the 
centuries. Magna Carta may be only eight years short of its eight 
hundredth anniversary, but its message in this respect is timeless. 
And that message needs to be heeded, not least, it might be 
thought, in the Administrative Court.‖70 
 
In two cases in the sphere of criminal law the issue was the procedures 
to be deployed when an application was made for an extension of custody 
limits.
71
 In the former Sir John Thomas President said ―the time limit 
placed on trying those in custody is a vital feature of our system of justice 
which distinguishes it from many of other countries...Not only does it 
provide a sure means of compliance with a principle of the common law 
as old as Magna Carta that justice delayed is justice denied but it has the 
collateral benefit that money is not squandered by the unnecessary 
detention of persons in prison awaiting trial at significant costs to the 
taxpayer‖: a happy blend of principle and pragmatism.  
The same emphasis on expeditious justice is found in a whole variety 
of contexts:  
 
 Binyan Mohammed, a British citizen once detained in 
Guantanamo Bay as a suspected terrorist sought disclosure of 
the United States documents held by the Foreign Office which 
he asserted would show that his confessions had been 
extracted by torture. Sir John Thomas P,. summarising the 
Courts conclusions, said ―To deny him at this time would be 
to deny him the opportunity of timely justice in respect of the 
charges against him, a principle dating back at least to the time 
of Magna Carta and which is now a basic part of our common 
law and of democratic values.‖72 
 
                                                     
70 And, it appears by a non-judicial body such as ACAS who were told to ‗get on 
with it‘ in Engineers and Managers Association v ACAS [1979] 1 WLR 1113 
(CA). 
71 R (on the application of McCauley) v Coventry Crown Court [2012] EWHC 
680 (Admin), [2012] 1 WLR 2766. Campbell Brown v Central Criminal Court 
[2015] EWHC 202 (Admin). 
72 R (on the application of Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs [2008] EWHC 2048 (Admin), [2009] 1 WLR 2579 [147]. 
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 In a complex commercial case where the Bank of St 
Petersburg sought to wrest control of a Marine Group from its 
then owner Mr Arkhangelsky
73
 and to rely upon a Russian 
judgment, which the English Courts refused to recognise, an 
issue arose as to whether Mr Arkhangelsky, who wished to 
counter claim against the Bank for conspiracy, deceit, duress 
and intimidation, could dispense with service on the Bank in 
the commercial court in order to avoid being time barred. Lord 
Justice Longmore noted that a Mr Stroilov, described by him 
as ―an associate of the Arkhangelskys..,with a certain 
knowledge of legal matters who subsequently acted as the 
Arkhanglesky‘s Mackenzie friend‖74… (the reference to a 
certain knowledge being a feline judicial euphemism for an 
uncertain and imperfect knowledge) ―had before the first 
instance Judge‖ as it was again somewhat ironically put, 
―helpfully referred the Judge to Magna Carta‖ though it is 
unclear what help that judge had derived from the reference, 
and certainly neither his
75
 nor the Court of Appeal‘s own 
judgment turned on it. 
 
But justice does not have to be delivered instantaneously; in Calvey v 
Secretary of State for Home Department,
76
 Jackson J was dealing with the 
aftermath of a decision of the House of Lords
77
 that the power of the 
Secretary of State to elongate a prison sentence beyond that stipulated by 
the trial Judge was a breach of an accused persons right to have his 
sentence determined by the judiciary, not the executive. Until new 
provisions to achieve that end were brought in force, Ms Calvey remained 
in prison. The Judge referred to the argument of his barrister,
78
 ―Mr 
Newman submits that in the present case there is a deferring of justice or 
right to the claimant contrary to chapter 29 of Magna Carta. There will 
then be long delays before her case can be considered, and by the time her 
case is considered she will be very close to the end of the 15 year tariff 
                                                     
73 Bank St Petersburg v Arkhangelsky [2014] EWCA Civ 593, [2014] 1 WLR 
4360. 
74 Ibid [3] (Longmore LJ). 
75 [2013] EWHC 2068 (Comm). 
76 [2003] EWHC 3450 (Admin). 
77
 R (on the application of Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2002] UKHL 46, [2003] 1 AC 837. 
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which has been set. If at the end of the day it turns out that the tariff ought 
to be very much shorter, for example that recommended by the trial judge, 
then she will have served substantially too long in prison, and that is 
contrary to Magna Carta‖, and continued:79 
 
―31. I am not persuaded by this submission for a number of 
reasons… although any delay in enacting legislation to correct 
incompatibilities between existing legislation and the Convention 
is unfortunate. ‗Defer‘ in chapter 29 of Magna Carta must be 
construed as meaning ‗defer for an unreasonable period‘. In my 
judgment, there is nothing unreasonable about the time which is 
elapsing between the decision of the House of Lords in Anderson 
and the likely date when the Criminal Justice Bill of 2003 will 
pass into law.‖ 
 
And there are delays and delays. It was optimistic, to put it at its 
lowest, for the prospective developers of Coin Street to complain that the 
Inspector had adjourned the start of the planning enquiry for a mere three 
months;
80
 for two persons convicted of handling stolen goods to seek to 
set aside their convictions because their trial had taken place more than 
the specified period of eight weeks from committal, especially since they 
had pleaded guilty.
81
 Magna Carta, though relied on, availed none of this 
diverse cohort of litigants. 
This precept of Magna Carta can be a sword as well as a shield. One 
husband was not permitted to seek to appeal a finding of cruelty against 
him 21 months out of time;
82
 another, the subject of a maintenance order 
for constructive desertion was held not to be entitled to full particulars of 
the case against him, as might have been the case in a trial in the High 
Court
83
 because as Simon P said ―Magna Carta itself linked delay of 
justice with denial of justice‖84 and to require such formality would be 
inconsistent with the exercise by magistrates of a summary jurisdiction. 
The principle – no delay in justice – has been deployed in the 
administrative as well as in the judicial sphere. 
                                                     
79 Ibid [31]. 
80
 Grevcote Estates v Radmor (CA, 1 January 1981). 
81
 R v Spring Hill Prison Governor ex p Sohi [1988] 1 WLR 596 (DC) 
Objectionable delays are remediable by abuse of process applications. R v Bow 
Street Magistrates Court ex p Choudhury (1990) 91 Crim App rep (CA). 
82
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83
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In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p Phansopkar
85
 
two women, one from India one from Bangladesh were denied entry at 
Heathrow when they sought to join their British husbands. Both were 
entitled to enter as long as they had a certificate of patriality under section 
3(9) of the Immigration Act 1971 and both were entitled to such 
certificate. But the queues at overseas offices for persons seeking entry, 
composed both of those who sought such certificate, and those who 
sought other forms of entry clearance created delays of up to 14 months 
before either woman could have received their the open sesame to 
England‘s green and pleasant land; hence their attempt to short circuit the 
process.. The Court of Appeal quashed the refusal of entry. All the 
members referred to Magna Carta.
86
 Lord Denning said that the women‘s 
rights cannot be taken away by arbitrarily refusing her a certificate or by 
delaying to issue it to her without good cause,
87
 and that bureaucratic 
delays were not such a cause. Scarman LJ looked not only back to Magna 
Carta but forward to Article 8 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights which protects the right of family life,
88
 although, of course, at that 
time it had not been incorporated into domestic law as it later was by the 
Human Rights Act 1998.
89
 
 
SALE OF JUSTICE 
 
It is not unexpected that complaints of sale of justice are all but 
undetectable in recent times. Whatever criticisms may be made of the 
English judiciary in that timeframe, the charge of corruption is not one 
The solitary example which I have unearthed concerns the attempt by 
Magistrates in Wandsworth to impose, as a prerequisite for granting a 
licence for increased facilities for drinking, a condition that the licence 
holder should surrender his other licences.
90
 Mr Justice Darling referred to 
the inhibition in the Charter on the sale of justice. He explained in reliance 
on a learned historical analysis by Professor McKechnie, the expert on the 
                                                     
85 [1976] QB 606 (CA). 
86 Ibid 621 (Lord Denning MR), 624 (Lawton LJ), 626 (Scarman LJ). 
87 Ibid 621.  
88 Ibid 626. 
89 See also R v Chief immigration Officer Heathrow Airport ex p Bibi [1976] 1 
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charter de ses jours. ―The suitor put his money down not to influence the 
judgment but to obtain a hearing. It was not that justice was sold. It was 
that the suitor was entitled to the justice of the Kings Courts… only as a 
matter of grace‖. He then mused, ―In the present case it seems to me that 
there was something in the nature of an attempt to return to the procedures 
of less civilised times‖.91 I am bound to comment that I cannot follow the 
Judge‘s train of thought, but he was, as Judge, celebrated as much for his 
eccentricities as for his erudition. He wore a silk hat whilst riding to Court 
on a horse accompanied by a liveried groom.
92
  
 
TRIAL BY PEERS 
 
Trial by one‘s peers is certainly guaranteed by Clause 39 but again it 
cannot stand against later and contradictory legislation. 
In R (Misick) v The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, the Claimant a former, and controversial, Premier of the Turks 
and Caicos Islands (―the Territory‖), sought permission by way of judicial 
review to challenge the legality of the Turks and Caicos Islands 
Constitution (Interim Amendment) Order 2009, whose effect when 
brought into force would be to suspend temporarily parts of the Turks and 
Caicos Islands‘ Constitution, by, among other things, removing the right 
to jury trial.  
Lord Justice Carnwath said;  
 
―22. In this case, the right to a jury trial has been traced back to 
Magna Carta and long-settled practice thereafter‖ 
 
but concluded… 
 
―42. There are no arguments which offer a realistic prospect of the 
Claimant‘s case succeeding at a full hearing; The Court will not 
enter into discussion of the merits of the particular measures. In 
the end, the challenge comes down to one of statutory construction 
or rationality, and on that basis it is bound in my view to fail.‖ 
 
Another example in a wholly different sphere, that of libel, the case of 
Cook v Telegraph Media Group Limited
93
 confirms the point. The salient 
facts were these: On 17 September 2006 an assistant of Mr Cook, then an 
                                                     
91 Ibid 497. 
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MP, made a £5 offertory donation at a Battle of Britain church service in 
Stockton. Mr Cook quite properly reimbursed his assistant. He then 
improperly, and certainly unwisely, included the £5 in his own claim for 
reimbursement of his expenses as an MP. It was predictably rejected. 
However, the very fact that he had made it became an issue in 2009 when 
the Daily Telegraph published its series of articles on MPs‘ expenses 
which attracted very wide publicity. Mr Cook boldly brought a suit for 
libel against the newspaper for their critical comments on his behaviour. 
The issue before Mr Justice Tugendhat was whether there should be trial 
by jury or trial by judge alone. 
The Judge delved into history… 
 
―101. Blackstone discussed separately the merits of trial by jury in 
civil actions in which the state was not a party. Book III at p 379ff. 
It reads:  
 
―The impartial administration of justice … is the great end of civil 
society. But if that be entirely intrusted to the magistracy, a select 
body of men, and those generally selected by the prince or such as 
enjoy the highest office in the state, their decisions, in spite of 
their own natural integrity, will have frequently an involuntary 
bias towards those of their own rank and dignity: it is not to be 
expected from human nature, that the few should always be 
attentive to the interests and good of the many… the most 
powerful individual in the state will be cautious of committing any 
flagrant invasion of another‘s right, when he knows that the fact of 
his oppression must be examined and decided by twelve 
indifferent [i.e. impartial] men not appointed till the hour of the 
trial.‖  
 
Despite these resonant comments, the Judge recognised the clear trend 
in modern case law, fortified by legislation,
94
 which made the traditional 
practice that a citizen‘s reputation should presumptively be in the hands of 
twelve not one obsolete, and ended: 
 
―115. This multiplicity of opportunities to argue the same point95 
is one of the major reasons why the costs of libel actions have 
become so disproportionate as to risk condemnation as an 
interference with freedom of expression and the right of access to 
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the court (see MGN v UK [2008] ECHR 1255 ). In these 
circumstances the effect of the Human Rights Act 1998 is to 
require judges and Parliament to continue to develop the law to 
make it Convention compliant. Trial with a jury makes such 
development more difficult.  
116. Taking all these considerations into account, I see no reason 
to exercise my discretion in this case to order this action to be tried 
with a jury, and every reason to order trial by judge alone.‖ 
 
In that case the Judge had also, if maybe superfluously in a civil case, 
cited Blackstone on Criminal trials: 
 
―98. As to criminal cases, Blackstone‘s Commentaries on the 
Laws of England Book IV (1769) p342–3 includes the following:  
‗The trial by jury … is also that trial by the peers of every 
Englishman, which, as the grand bulwark of his liberties, is 
secured to him by [Magna Carta]… in times of difficulty and 
danger, more is to be apprehended from the violence and partiality 
of judges appointed by the crown, in suits between the king and 
the subject than, than in disputes between one individual and 
another.‖ 
 
Yet even in that sphere the trend is clear. More cases are delegated to 
the magistracy; and the notion that complex commercial crimes would be 
better tried by specially composed courts with a degree of financial 
expertise, and the concern that juris verdicts are unreasoned is the subject 
of continued policy debate. Magna Carta will be prayed in aid by those 
who object to such trend but prayers cannot stand out against a 
Parliamentary majority.
96
 Lord Devlin once described the jury was ―the 
lamp that shows that freedom lives‖;97 but it is a lamp whose light is being 
progressively dimmed. 
But when juries are provided, of what must they consist? Who are the 
peers to which clause 39 refers? In R v Danso & Hodge
98
 Mr Hodge 
convicted of a series of serious offences of violence made, as the Court of 
Appeal‘s judgment recited a whole series of complaints to the effect that it 
was wrong for him to be tried by 12 whites, who included, he complained, 
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Thomas Grant, Jeremy Hutchinson’s Case Histories. (John Murray 2015) 371. 
97
 Patrick Devlin, Trial by Jury (Stevens & Sons Ltd 1956) 164, cited in R v 
Mirza [2004] UKHL 2, [2004] 1 AC 1118. 
98 [2005] EWCA Crim 620. 
MAGNA CARTA IN THE TWENTIETH AND TWENTY FIRST 
CENTURIES 
 
22 
seven women. He had submitted that is not a trial, amongst other things, 
by his peers in accordance with, amongst other things, Magna Carta, or 
with requirements of fairness.
99
 This argument, along with others, in 
which in scattergun style, he blamed indifferently judge, police, 
prosecution and his former legal advisers for undermining his defence and 
failing in their respective duties, was summarily dismissed. The law on 
juries, then and now, is race and gender blind. 
 
UNLAWFUL DETENTION 
 
Magna Carta provides no guarantee of life, but it does protect liberty 
which stands between life and the pursuit of happiness as the objectives in 
the Declaration of Independence. 
In the famous Belmarsh case where legislation allowing for the 
detention without trial of foreign, but not British, nationals suspected of 
involvement in terrorism was held unjustifiably discriminatory
100
Lord 
Bingham said ―in arguing the fundamental importance of the right to 
personal freedom the appellants were able to draw on the long libertarian 
tradition of English law dating back to Clause 39 of the Magna Carta, 
given effect in the ancient remedy of habeas corpus, declared in the 
Petition of Right 1628, upheld in a series of landmark decisions down the 
centuries and embodied in the substance and procedures of the law to our 
own day.‖101 
Scarcely less eloquent were the words of Lord Phillips, his successor 
as senior law lord, in a mental health case
102
 ―the common law respects 
and protects the personal freedom of the individual which may not be 
curtailed save for a reason and in the circumstances reflected in the law of 
the land. This principle is reflected in but does not depend on Article 5(1) 
of the European Convention on Human Rights. It can be traced back to 
chapter 29 of Magna Carta 1297 and before that to chapter 30 of Magna 
Carta 1215.‖103 
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INTER ARMA LEGES SILENT? 
 
Especially in times of war, laws and orders designed to protect the 
community against potential threats have had to be tested against that 
historic bedrock; and now with legitimate anxieties about the presence of 
an enemy within, not as before aliens but even British citizens, the same 
exercise – the balance of private rights against public interests – is 
required. 
 
Mental health 
 
But it is not only in such extreme situations that the principle is 
engaged. 
In a case which came before the Court of Protection
104
 the question 
was whether a local authority could keep a man in a residential support 
unit contrary to his wishes and those of his father. Peter Jackson J stated 
―If a local authority seeks to regulate control compel restrict confine or 
coerce‖ a liberal use of a thesaurus, ―it must, except in an emergency 
point to specific statutory authority for what it is doing or obtain the 
approval of the Court.‖105 He continued ―The origin of this basic principle 
is to be found in an era long before the invention of local authorities as we 
know them‖ and quoted predictably chapter 29 of Magna Carta 1297106 
adding ―The Court of Appeal has recently said this right to freedom is a 
fundamental constitutional right (a reference to a dictum of Toulson 
LJ).
107
 It will certainly not lose its importance in the field of adult social 
care with an ageing population increasing the responsibilities of families 
and state‖ 
And many cases in this discrete area illustrate the truth of his 
proposition. 
In another the issue was whether a Tribunal rather than the Secretary 
of State was empowered to order the discharge of a patient from a mental 
hospital into a care home but from which he could only move among the 
community under escort, so indisputably restricting his liberty.
108
 Arden 
LJ echoed the sentiments:  
                                                     
104 Hillingdon LBC v Neary [2011] EWHC 1377 (COP), [2011] 4 All ER 584. 
105 Ibid [22].  
106 Ibid [23]. 
107 In R (TTM) v Hackney LBC [2011] EWCA Civ 4, [2011] 1 WLR 2873 [33] 
(Toulson LJ).  
108 Secretary of State for Justice v RB [2011] EWCA Civ 1608, [2012] 1 WLR 
2043.  
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She said ―The right to liberty of person is a fundamental right. It has 
been so regarded since at least the time of the well-known provisions of 
Clause 39 of Magna Carta, which in due course found its reflection in 
Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 5 of 
the European Convention…‖109 So important was this right that it was 
nothing to the point, held the Court of Appeal, that the discharge even on 
those restricting terms was in the best interests of the patient.
110
 
A different issue arose in another case where a mental patient refused 
a social worker permission to consult his nearest relatives on whether he 
should be admitted for treatment. As a result the social worker 
determined, without consideration of all the circumstances, that it was 
―not reasonably practicable to do so‖ which was the only qualification to 
the duty to consult imposed by the Mental Health Act 1983. Aikens LJ, 
stressing the importance of compliance with the provisions of that Act 
continued ―If they are not‖, as Toulson LJ said in R (TTM) v Hackney 
LBC, since the statute of Magna Carta ch. 29 1297… ―a person can obtain 
redress where her right confirmed by that statute has been infringed even 
though there is no provision in the 1983 Act; which enables her personally 
to do so.‖ 
In the case referred to by Aikens LJ (and indeed by Peter Jackson J) , 
Toulson LJ had instanced the writ of habeas corpus and the writ for 
trespass as reinforcing the substantive protection of Ch 29
111
 which itself 
is actually silent on remedy for breach.
112
 In an earlier case Lord 
Donaldson MR had cited Magna Carta as confirming that habeas corpus 
lay against the Crown itself
113
 but, more precisely and accurately, habeas 
corpus was described in the House of Lords as ―rendered more actively 
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110 The same substantive issue was revisited by the Supreme Court, where the 
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remedial by the statute of Charles II but founded upon the broad basis of 
Magna Carta ...the principal bulwark of English liberty.‖114  
 
Immigration detention 
 
Another area of contemporary political and social importance and 
indeed controversy is immigration.  
In R (on the application of Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department
115
 the Secretary of State, John Reid MP, had an unpublished 
policy that for all prisoners who were subject to immigration control and 
liable to deportation on completion of their sentence of imprisonment 
should be detained pending deportation. This was inconsistent with his 
published policy which allowed for discretion and hence violated a well 
established principle of public law 
Lord Collins of Mapesbury said ―This is a case in which on any view 
there has been a breach of duty by the executive in the exercise of its 
power of detention. Fundamental rights are in play‖. He then quoted Ch. 
39 of Magna Carta 1215 (9 Hen 3) adding that the liberty of the subject as 
a fundamental constitutional principle hardly needs the great authority of 
Sir Thomas Bingham MR but it is worth recalling what he said in his book 
The Rule of Law 2010 at p.10 about the fundamental provisions of Magna 
Carta ―These are words which should be inscribed on the stationary of the 
Home Office‖,116 the department which Mr Reid himself famously 
described on his accession to his high office as unfit for purpose.
117
 
At the other end of the chronological spectrum in immigration matters 
which stretches from entry to expulsion, in a case involving a juvenile 
asylum seeker
118
 the issue was the lawfulness of the decision by the 
Secretary of State to detain pending removal the claimant, a juvenile 
citizen of Afghanistan. 
Lady Justice Arden opined: 
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115 [2011] UKSC 12 , [2012] 1 AC 245. I represented the Home Department. 
116 Ibid [217]. 
117
 See further R (on the application of Detention Action) v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 1634. 
118 R (on the application of AA (Afghanistan)) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2012] EWCA Civ 1383. 
MAGNA CARTA IN THE TWENTIETH AND TWENTY FIRST 
CENTURIES 
 
26 
―…the burden of showing that the detention was lawful falls on 
the Secretary of State‖ 
 
and referred in swift succession to Magna Carta, Article 5 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (―UNCRC‖) and other international instruments. 
Ultimately no instruments, ancient or modern, saved the claimant 
from removal. 
 
Extradition 
 
In the field of extradition the same principle is engaged. In the case of 
Juana Chaois v Spain
119
 the High Court of Northern Ireland was seized of 
an application by the Respondent to revoke the Appellant‘s bail, and 
commit him to custody. The issue to be determined was jurisdictional, 
namely whether the High Court or any other agency was empowered to 
take the measures requested.  
McCloskey J noted that there was no express power to that effect in 
the Extradition Act 2003. He continued; 
 
[27] The suggestion of an implied statutory power of the kind 
mooted is contradicted by two further considerations. The first is 
Article 5/1 ECHR… In short, a power of this kind would lack the 
essential qualities of accessibility and foreseeability. The second 
contra indication is the nature of the power. Such a power would 
entail deprivation of the citizen‘s liberty. The common law has 
long recognised liberty as a hallowed right and it possesses a 
similar ranking in Convention jurisprudence.  
There is no justification in logic or in principle for adopting a less 
robust approach where the detaining agency is the court, rather 
than the executive.  
 
CONTEMPT OF COURT 
 
The necessity of finding an express provision justifying detention to 
override the Magna Carta presumption in favour of liberty is shown in a 
pair of cases in the sphere of contempt of court, where incarceration is one 
of the options available to a Court. It has been held that there is no power 
to remand in custody someone pending a decision as to what is the 
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appropriate sanction in his case for such contempt.
120
 nor someone 
arrested under a search and find order in connection with alleged child 
abduction unless and until the contempt by way of breach an earlier court 
order to return the child was proved.
121
 
 
Protection of Property 
 
Chapter 39 protects not only the person, but property against arbitrary 
seizure.
122
 Many of the most famous constitutional cases arise from the 
executive appetite in wartime to lay its hands on whatever suits its 
purpose provoking inevitably pleas to that Article.
123
 In the case of De 
Keysers Royal Hotel
124
 it was stated ―Since Magna Carta the estate of a 
subject in lands or buildings has been protected against the prerogative of 
the Crown‖, Lord Parmoor suggesting that not only out and out seizure, 
but also interference with use and occupation fell within the remit of 
Clause 39
125
 although in another case
126
 where a company complained 
about a refusal of permission to build factories and shops on its land 
Viscount Simonds said dismissively but realistically ―Such a diminution 
of rights can be affected without a cry being raised that Magna Carta is 
being dethroned or a sacred principle of liberty infringed.‖127 Arbitrary of 
course means without colour of law. The problem is the wealth of law 
governing everything from compulsory purchase to enforcement of 
                                                     
120 Delaney v Delaney [1996] QB 387 (CA). 
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judgments to revenue raising measures, all overriding property rights. Do 
not rely on Magna Carta against a Mansion tax or similar future scheme. 
 
EXILE 
 
Extradition in an age a mutual assistance between states designed to 
combat crime is commonplace. Exile to which I now turn is exceptional. 
The most significant case R v Secretary of State for the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office ex p Bancoult
128
 illuminates both the strength and 
the weakness of Magna Carta. It concerned what Lord Hoffman described 
as the ―sad story‖129 of the Chagos islanders, inhabitants of an archipelago 
in the British Indian Overseas Territories. Diego Garcia, the largest island, 
because of its position, had significant strategic potential and the USA 
desired it as a military base. Between 1968 and 1971 the majority of the 
islanders were relocated in Mauritius, not by force, but as a result of the 
closure of the plantation company which was their sole source of supply 
of necessaries from the outside world. 
The interests of the islanders were disparagingly referred to in an 
inter-office memorandum as ―a few Tarzans or Men Fridays‖130 in an era 
where racial equality, let alone political correctness was unheard of, but 
whose disclosure by the respondent department was itself a testimony to 
the transparency both required of and respected by public authorities.
131
 In 
1971 an Immigration Ordinance stipulated that no-one could enter the 
territory without a permit, and in 2004 belt was added to braces by a 
further ordinance expelling the few who remained in situ.
132
 
It was common ground in the challenge to the later Ordinance that it 
raised issues under Article 39. Neither King John nor the barons at 
Runnymede knew even of the existence of Diego Garcia. It was 
nonetheless in law British territory from which prima facie citizens could 
                                                     
128 [2008] UKHL 61, [2009] 1 AC 453. 
129 Ibid [9]. 
130 Quoted in a first instance decision in the same series of cases, R (on the 
application of Bancoult) v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office [2001] QB 1067 (DC) 1083 E (Laws LJ).   
131 See the approving comments of Laws LJ and Gibbs J at Ibid [63] (Laws LJ), 
[72] Gibbs J.  
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not be expelled.
133
 But the right was not an unqualified right; it was 
expressly made ―subject to the law of the land.‖ The key question which 
divided the majority and minority was whether the prerogative power, as 
distinct from legislation, was sufficient to annul the right. For the minority 
Lord Mance said ―A constitution which exiles territories‘ inhabitants is a 
contradiction in terms.‖134 For the majority Lord Hoffman said ―In a ceded 
colony…the Crown has plenary legislative authority. It can make or 
control the law of the land. The right of abode is a creature of the law. The 
law gives it and the law may take it away.‖135 The Islanders had to take 
their claims for a return to their homeland to the European Court of 
Human Rights where they failed because they had already accepted 
compensation for resettlement elsewhere.
136
 
 
PROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT 
 
The principles of Magna Carta have infiltrated the last phase of the 
criminal process: the imposition of sanction. In one of the many cases in 
which the Privy Council had, with undisguised reluctance, to deal with 
death penalty cases from Caribbean jurisdictions, it had to determine 
whether a provision of Bahamian law prescribing the death penalty should 
be construed as mandatory or discretionary; it opted for the more lenient 
construction. As, Lord Bingham said; ―the principle that criminal 
penalties should be proportionate to the gravity of the offence committed 
can be traced back to the Magna Carta; Chapter 14 of which prohibited 
excessive amercements‖ and, in the words of one commentator, ―clearly 
stipulated as fundamental law a prohibition of excessive punishment.‖137 
 
 
 
                                                     
133 ex p Bancoult (n 129) [42] (Lord Hoffman), [85] (Lord Rodger), [124] (Lord 
Carswell), [151] Lord Mance. 
134 Ibid [157].  
135 Ibid [45] See to like effect as to approach, if not conclusion: R (on the 
application of Bancoult) (n 131) [34] (Laws LJ). 
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 The Guardian (London, 20 December 2012). 
137 Bowe v the Queen [2006] UKPC 10, [2006] 1 WLR 1623 [30] (Lord 
Bingham). See too R v Morris (Charles) 1951 1 KB 394 (CA). Nonetheless the 
fact that the sentence for common law conspiracy to defraud was at the discretion 
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DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
 
But sometimes weight is imposed on Magna Carta which it does not 
easily bear. In another case in the same sequence the Privy Council had to 
decide whether a provision entitling the prosecution to appeal when a trial 
judge had erroneously dismissed its case was constitutional. The judge 
had, wrongly in the view of the Privy Council, excluded evidence adduced 
to show that the death of the victim of an assault was the consequence of 
the assault itself and not of treatment subsequently administered in 
hospital on the basis that the expert called was not qualified to tender such 
an opinion. Counsel for the respondent accused argued: ―Before 
independence and the Republican constitutions of Trinidad and Tobago 
came into force double jeopardy was a recognised principle of 
considerable antiquity; Magna Carta 1354 confirmation Chapter 39.‖138 
Whether this was so or not, and it seems an optimistic reading of the text, 
the Privy Council found nothing constitutionally objectionable in such 
prosecutorial appeal.  
 
OPEN JUSTICE 
 
Another illustration of the same ambition extravagantly to magnify 
Magna Carta‘s effect can be detected in the case of Commissioner of the 
police for the Metropolis v Times Newspapers Ltd.
139
 There the newspaper 
sought to make use of leaked police documents to defend a libel action 
brought by a person whose criminal network was said by the Sunday 
Times to be so vast that Scotland Yard regarded him as too big to take on. 
The question was whether it could do so. Tugendhat J said ―The principle 
of freedom of expression in all proceedings in court is so highly regarded 
by the law that it is given effect to by defences of absolute (sometimes 
qualified) privilege and witness immunity. These principles can be traced 
back to the origins of the right to a fair trial which had already been 
recognised before it was included in Magna Carta in 1215.‖140 The 
conclusion seems farfetched. 
But then the same judge had form in this area. In LNS v Persons 
Unknown, the claimant, the initially disguised, the former English football 
captain and Chelsea centre half John Terry
141
 – no role model he – sought 
                                                     
138 Trinidad and Tobago v Boyce [2006] UKPC 1, [2006] 2 AC 76. 
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an injunction to prevent revelation of the fact that he was sleeping with 
another team member‘s wife. In rejecting the claim which he held to be 
more concerned with protecting the commercial value of the player‘s 
commercial reputation rather than his or his paramour‘s privacy, the Judge 
said ―Open justice is one of the oldest principles of English law, going 
back to before Magna Carta‖142 but not, as far as I can discern, actually 
included in it. 
 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
 
Other principles have been read into Magna Carta by advocates 
seeking to clothe their submissions with spurious pedigree. One case 
involved an asylum seeker requiring accommodation
143
 to which he would 
be entitled if he was a minor, but not if he was not. Was it for the claimant 
to show that he was a minor or the local authority to prove that he was 
not? The ordinary rule is of course that he who asserts something essential 
to a claim, or for that matter defence, bears the burden of proving it; but 
there are some exceptions. Counsel for the Applicant submitted that ―the 
origin of exception ―to the presumption of regularity‖ may have lain, at 
least instinctively in chapter 39 of |Magna Carta 1215(9 Hen 3)… as set 
out in Sir Thomas Bingham‘s The Rule of Law‖. Even the qualification, at 
least instinctively, does not save the observation from the charge of 
overheated imagination, and Lord Bingham‘s name as a potential 
supporter of this thesis was surely taken in vain. 
Nor did Magna Carta provide special rules to protect an owner of 
property threatened with compulsory purchase. A decision to exercise 
such power could only be challenged on conventional Wednesbury 
grounds of unreasonableness.
144
 
 
NATURAL JUSTICE 
 
The same tendency to wishful resort to the Charter was displayed in 
an extradition case.
145
 Lord Donaldson MR stated that it was elementary 
that a person threatened with extradition was entitled to know the case 
                                                     
142 Ibid 106. 
143 R (On the application of CJ v Cardiff CC [2011] EWCA Civ 1590, [2012] 2 
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144 R v Secretary of State for Transport ex p Rothschild [1989] 1 All ER 933 
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against him ―without‖ as he said somewhat archly ―having to refer to 
Magna Carta.‖146 Clearly in his view a reference by Counsel too far.147 
 
TORTURE 
 
I must therefore emphasise that Magna Carta is simply not the source 
of all that is good in English law, the seed of every plant in the field of 
justice. 
In the case which authoritatively laid down that evidence obtained by 
torture was inadmissible in our courts
148
 Lord Bingham in confirming the 
common laws long standing aversion to torture noted the fact ―that 
reliance was placed on sources of doubtful validity such as Chapter 39 of 
Magna Carta 1215… does not weaken the strength of received 
opinion.‖149 
But not all Judges are so willing to deny the link. 
In another case involving Binyan Mohammed, an application to redact 
passages in a judgment on the ground that their inclusion would damage 
the relationship of the United States of America and the United 
Kingdom.
150
 Lord Judge referred to Chapter 29 of Magna Carta before 
concluding ―all the said ancient authors are against any pain, or torment to 
be put or inflicted upon prisoners before attainder, nor after attainder but 
according to judgement.‖151 
In a later case J v the Metropolitan Commissioner of Police
152
 the 
actual issue was again a narrow procedural one; what was the correct 
forum for claims in tort and for breach of convention rights brought by 
environmental protesters who had been persuaded into sexual 
relationships with an undercover police officer masquerading as a green 
sympathiser. In the course of his judgment Tugendhat J, something, as 
you will by now have appreciated, of a Magna Carta groupie, said ―The 
right not to be subject to degrading treatment has been recognised by the 
                                                     
146 Ibid 322. 
147 Ibid 396 G-H. 
148 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 
AC 221. 
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common law from the earliest time‖. According to Blackstone amongst 
the natural rights recognised by the common law were, in the words of 
Magna Carta, ―a prohibition not only of killing and maiming but also of 
torturing to which our laws are strangers.‖153 
 
FORENSIC FAILURE 
 
Sometimes Magna Carta is deployed as ballast. In the leading case on 
control orders
154
 Counsel submitted that ―the right to liberty and freedom 
from arbitrary detention lies at the heart of the domestic legal system as 
the pre-eminent freedom guaranteed by the common law since Magna 
Carta‖: a legitimate submission. The same use was made in the famous 
case of Liversidge v Anderson concerned with wartime internment under 
the notorious 18B
155
 which provoked the most celebrated dissent in 
English legal history by Lord Atkin: ―I view with apprehension the 
attitude of judges who on a mere question of construction when face to 
face with claims involving the liberty of the subject show themselves 
more executive minded than the executive.‖156 
 However Magna Carta can sometimes indeed be not merely an 
unnecessary and gratuitous add on to an otherwise reputable argument 
but, as I have already illustrated, the last resort of the forensic failure. 
In Attorney-General’s Reference No.1 of 1990 it was argued that that a 
mere two years deferment in prosecuting a police officer for assault, 
which had resulted from the explicable need to await the outcome of the 
trial of the two alleged victims whom he had arrested violated Article 39 
so that the prosecution should be stayed. Lord Lane LCJ gave short shrift 
to this ambitious contention. ―Delay‖ he ruled ―means at its lowest 
wrongful delay such as is not justified by the circumstances of the 
case.‖157 It is a curious feature of that case that the unsuccessful Counsel, 
Anthony Arlidge QC was co-author with Lord Judge of ―Magna Carta 
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Uncovered‖ and the junior member of the Court which rejected his 
argument was Judge J himself.
158
 
But Mr Arlidge‘s efforts were surely trumped by those of Mr Randle-
Joliffe, who sought to quash orders for possession in favour of the City of 
London made against the protesters of the Occupy Movement: ideological 
opponents of capitalism of the philosophical school of Russell Brand, who 
had pitched their tent in the environs of St Pauls Cathedral.
159
 Lord 
Neuberger MR referred politely to his ―esoteric arguments‖ which he then 
enumerated:  
 
―First he challenged the judgement on the ground that it did not 
apply to him as a Magna Carta heir. But that is a concept unknown 
to the law. He also says that his Magna Carta rights would be 
breached by execution of the orders but only chapters 1, 9 and 29 
of Magna Carta 1297 version survive. Chapter 29 with its 
requirement that the state proceeds according to law and its 
prohibition on the selling or delaying of justice is seen by many as 
the historical foundation of the rule of law in England but has no 
bearing on the arguments in this case.‖ 
 
Somewhat ironically, Lord Neuberger added, ―the two other clauses 
concern the rights of the Church and of the City of London and cannot 
help the Defendants.‖ One might add au contraire… 
The latitude characteristically in our courts extended to litigants in 
person was stretched to breaking point in the first instance decision in the 
same case
160
 where the same Randle Joliffe referred to ―the fairness 
founded in Magna Carta‖ and his fellow dissenter Mr Ashman invoked 
Magna Carta as allowing persons in ―situations of…overwhelming 
urgency…to respond by breaking the law‖, a charter on this exotic 
analysis not then for rule law but for lawlessness. 
Still less persuasive, were that possible, was the argument of a private 
investigator who, in blatant and deliberate breach of a reporting restriction 
order, continued to assert that a husband involved in acrimonious divorce 
proceedings whom she was tracking was a rapist and paedophile and then 
sought to resist committal for contempt relying on ―her inalienable right 
under common law and the inviolable right to exercise lawful rebellion 
                                                     
158 In Tan Soon Gin (George) v Cameroon [1992] 2 AC 205 (PC) 222 a similar 
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under Chapter 61 of Magna Carta‖. The President of the Family Division 
commented intelligibly on these submissions: ―Once again I do not 
understand these in the context of committal summons.‖161 
Nor indeed do I. The clause Chapter 61 is, described in Arlidge and 
Judge as ―the security clause‖ enabling the provisions of the Charter162 to 
be ―guaranteed by the barons choosing 25 of their number with powers of 
distrait and distress against the Crown, if the King does not observe its 
terms.‖163 While the authors imaginatively describe the clause as 
establishing ―representative action and majority voting‖,164 the private 
investigator‘s attempt to deploy it as a justification for her violation of a 
court order trespasses beyond the boundaries of imagination and into the 
realm of illusion, not least of course because it had been long repealed. 
Litigants in person are clearly particularly prone to rely on Magna 
Carta, or their misunderstanding of it, where all else fails. Mr Rockliff 
brought proceedings before a tax tribunal
165
 complaining that the taxation 
of his police pension as his sole income and not the joint income of 
himself and his wife discriminated against him as a married man, indeed 
against the institution of marriage itself. The Chairman recorded
166
 at 22:  
 
The taxpayer also submitted at all three hearings a great deal of non-
statutory material, in support of his argument ranging from Magna 
Carta to statements by Ministers in Parliament and contemporary 
articles speeches and radio interviews. It is interesting and 
informative, and doubtless material to the policy decisions of the 
legislature, but it does not constitute legal authority which the tribunal 
is entitled to take into account or is bound by, and I will not refer to it 
further. I repeatedly explained this to the taxpayer, who replied that he 
wished this material to be ―on the record‖; it is accordingly retained in 
the tribunal‘s files. 
 
Where, no doubt, if you are interested, it can still be located. 
Nor did Mr Davidson fare any better before the VAT and Duties 
tribunal suggesting that the Revenue and Customs Commissioners had no 
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right to seize and to refuse to return his illegally imported tobacco without 
trial and judgment of a court of law as the Charter allegedly required.
167
 
Magna Carta has been wheeled out without success in cases for 
compensation for unfair dismissal
168
 to invalidate the compulsory 
introduction of metric in place of imperial weights
169
 to prevent on his 
own appeal one solicitor from being struck off the roll for fraud
170
 or 
another solicitor from suffering the same fate on the application of a 
businessman who complained that the solicitor‘s clients, not the solicitor 
himself, had given false evidence against him:
171
 an application which, 
had it won the day, would have added fresh terrors to the practice of law. 
Magna Carta proved no basis for a challenge to the congestion 
charge
172
 or to regulations altering the criteria for blue badges for 
disability parking
173
 or, on a matter of greater moment, the diminution of 
national sovereignty involved in the Treaty of Nice and the European 
Communities Amendment Act.
174
 
The striking out of claims for negligence against two major 
pharmaceutical companies for damage allegedly caused by their anti-
depressant pills
175
 on the basis that individual plaintiffs at the highest 
would recover little and the costs of defending the claims would be 
disproportionate, did not involve a denial of justice; nor did the non-
disclosure to a plaintiff in a family dispute of medical evidence which was 
relied on to justify the official solicitor taking over his threadbare case.
176
  
The Court of Appeal declined to decide whether Magna Carta could 
be relied on as the source of an award of exemplary or punitive damages 
for wrongful arrest by police officers but displayed no enthusiasm for the 
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proposition;
177
 nor did it save a drug trafficker in Singapore from 
execution.
178
  
The House of Lords dismissed claims made for compensation by 
someone mistakenly certified, in the language of the early twentieth 
century, as a lunatic.
179
 He addressed the House himself. Viscount 
Haldane, while noting that the Appellant was ―obviously of an excitable 
disposition‖ said that the question was whether the defendant had 
reasonably thought him to be of unsound mind. Among the items of 
evidence considered adverse to the appellant was that a medical officer 
had thought him ―to have exaggerated ideas of his own importance‖, that 
he refused to ―eat animal food or drink milk‖180 that he ―would not do any 
work but lay in bed till the middle of the day‖181 ―worried his mother with 
questions for hours at a time‖182 and had ―pulled down curtains at his 
father‘s house.‖183 There but for the grace of God may some of us go… 
Even witnesses can pray Magna Carta in aid though to no greater 
benefit. In R v Usman Ali
184
 Mr Khan, victim of an unsuccessful 
murderous attack, provided the key testimony against those charged as his 
assailants. Under strenuous cross-examination in which he displayed a 
penchant for not answering the question but for making statements, for 
which the Judge properly chided him, he commented ―Magna Carta no 
man shall be denied justice‖, adding ominously ―if they (presumably the 
accused) come back on the street you are going to have the biggest war on 
your hands.‖ 
 
MAGNA CARTA’S INFLUENCE 
 
So to the question posed by Adam Tomkins in an article in Public 
Law ―would a court go so far as to invalidate an executive decision solely 
on the basis that it violated clause 29 of Magna Carta or is Magna Carta 
now something which is, as a matter of law, capable of carrying only 
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symbolic or rhetorical weight?‖185 I would be compelled to answer it is the 
latter rather than the former. 
My tour d‘horizon of the last 115 years, my chosen time frame shows, 
I must conclude, that, Magna Carta has never been necessary to a judicial 
decision and that whether it has been sufficient is an all but meaningless 
question. Lord Bingham in his magisterial statement in the Belmarsh case 
about the ancestry of the right to liberty in English law started but did not 
end with Magna Carta. It is hard to imagine that, even without Magna 
Carta, the same right would not have taken root in later centuries. Indeed 
the overwhelming majority of the cases exemplify what Magna Carta 
cannot do rather than what it can, and many constitutional principles of 
the first water, such as the fact that only primary legislation entitles the 
state raises taxes, have been decided without reference to it even when it 
was argued.
186
 
There are obvious reasons for this decline in influence.  
First Magna Carta has been progressively repealed with, as I said at 
the outset, only 4 out of 63 clauses still extant. 
Secondly even those clauses which have survived cannot stand against 
later inconsistent legislation; this lecture is littered with examples of 
which the Chagos case is only the most prominent. As Darling J said 
―Magna Carta has not remained untouched, and like every other law of 
England is not condemned to that immunity from development and 
improvement which was attributed to the laws of the Medes and the 
Persians.‖187 Or as Lord Atkinson said, concurring in a judgment, that the 
internment of a naturalized British subject of German birth was validated 
by DORA in World War 1, DORA ―was itself part of the law of the land; 
if it were otherwise then every statute and every intra vires rule or by law 
having the force of law creating a new offence for which imprisonment 
could be inflicted would amount, pro tanto to a repeal of Magna Carta.‖188  
Thirdly the value of is key provisions, Clauses 39 and 40, have been 
enhanced and updated in later and more focussed legislation.
189
 
                                                     
185
 ‗Magna Carta, Crown and colonies‘ [2001] PL 571. 
186
 See Bowles v Bank of England [1913] 1 Ch 57 (Ch) 61-2. 
187
 Chester v Bateson [1920] 1 KB 829 (KB) 832 (a case where under DORA not 
only was property requisitioned but the owner prevented from challenging its 
requisition in the Courts: see further ibid 839 (Avory J). 
188
 R v Halliday [1917] AC. 260 (HL) 272. The exercise of the prerogative to 
deport an enemy alien was held consistent with Magna carta in Netz v Ede [1946] 
Ch 224 (Ch) 234 (Wynn Parry J).  
189 See for example Re C’s Application for Judicial Review [2012] NIQB 62 (QB 
Northern Ireland) ‗It has been said from the time of Magna Carta that justice 
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Fourthly, a point I could not have made on the seven hundredth or 
even the 750
th
 anniversary, we look today to analogous articles of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, not least Article 5(4) of the 
ECHR: the prohibition on arbitrary detention and Article 6: the right to a 
fair trial, which have made reliance on Magna Carta redundant.
190
 
In Oxfordshire CC v DP,
191
 a case about how far the Court could go at 
an interim stage in proceedings in making findings of fact as to the 
father‘s responsibility for injury to his child. Macfarlane J said: 
 
Magna Carta is not habitually quoted in support of legal argument 
in the Family Division, it is however of interest to be reminded of 
the terms of its Chapter 29 and to measure them up against the 
more modern and well known provisions of ECHR, Art 8. There is 
in my view very little difference between the requirements laid 
down in these two instruments, despite the passage of over 700 
years between the two. That this is so is really of no surprise. Both 
are fundamental statements of core human rights. For the purposes 
of the ―lawfulness‖ argument raised in this case, I fully accept that 
any process upon which this court embarks to find facts in these 
proceedings must be ―by lawful judgment‖ and ―by the law of the 
land‖ (per 1215) or ―in accordance with the law‖ (per 1950).192  
 
 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 
 
Current debate about the future of our legal system in the age of 
austerity focusses on the restrictions on judicial review, the reduction in 
legal aid and the increase in court fees. The first two could be classified as 
instances of the denial of justice; the latter as its sale. Yet though all three 
have been the subject of actual or proposed legal challenges, Magna Carta 
was not placed in the forefront of the argument.  
The first, restriction of judicial review, was considered in a claim 
brought by several well-known campaigning law firms to regulations for 
the introduction of a ―no permission, no fee‖ arrangement for making a 
                                                                                                                        
delayed is justice denied. This has perhaps received new vigour from cases under 
Article 6.‘ 
190
 Although Magna Carta‘s role as the inspiration of such instruments is itself 
important. 
191 [2005] EWHC 1593 (Fam), [2005] 2 FLR 1031. 
192 Ibid [11]. 
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legally aided application for judicial review.
193
 The issue was whether 
section 1 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 
2012, an awkwardly double jointed statute, more familiar known, in the 
modern taste for acronyms as LASPO could be read as, contemplating that 
where substantial legal services under the scheme established by it are 
properly provided they will nonetheless have to be provided without 
payment. The claimants complained of its chilling effect on access to the 
High Court inasmuch as lawyers might be deterred from taking on clients 
with meritorious but not straightforward claims because of the threat of no 
remuneration. The Lord Chancellor retorted that the providers of legal 
services should bear the risk of determining whether cases to be advanced 
by those clients qualified for legal aid on a proper interpretation of the 
relevant criteria. The Divisional Court upheld the challenge insofar as the 
scope of the impugned regulation ―extends beyond the circumstances 
which can be seen as rationally connected to the purpose given for its 
introduction.‖194 So the outcome turned on construction of a twenty first 
not of a thirteen century statute  
The second, the restriction of legal aid has prompted the judiciary on 
several occasions to suggest
195
 that it is a false economy leading to 
additional expense for the Courts. In a recent divorce case an 
unrepresented husband sought an order for disclosure of documents 
against the police, a non-party, a procedural issue described by Lord 
Justice Aikens as ―technical and unusual‖. 
 In the course of his ruling he added:  
 
Yet again the Courts have been without any legal assistance and 
had had to spend time researching the law for itself, then 
attempting to apply it to the relevant facts in order to arrive at the 
correct legal answer. To do the latter exercise meant that the Court 
itself had to trawl through a large amount of documents in the file. 
All that involved an expensive use of judicial time which was in 
short supply already. Money might have been saved from the legal 
aid funds but an equal amount of expense, if not more, had been 
incurred in terms of the costs of judges and courts time. The result 
was that there had been in fact no economy at all. Worse, that way 
                                                     
193 R (on the application of Ben Hoare Bell Solicitors and others) v Lord 
Chancellor [2015] EWHC 523 (Admin), [2015] All ER (D) 19 (Mar). 
194 Ibid [72]. 
195 See cases cited in Michael J B Beloff QC, ‗Virtuous Values - the Advocates 
Contribution to the Rule of Law (McDermott Lecture Queens University Belfast 
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of dealing with the cases ran the risk that a correct result would 
not be reached because the court had not the legal assistance of 
counsel that it should have had and the court had no other legal 
assistance available to it.
196
  
 
But he entirely, maybe prudently, refrained from seeking to engage 
Magna Carta in a judgment whose intended audience was clearly the 
Ministry of Justice. 
The third, higher court fees, had a more promising prologue. At the 
three day legal summit in London celebrating the sealing of Magna Carta, 
with an acute eye for public relations, legal bodies including the Law 
Society and the Bar Council issued a pre action protocol letter putting the 
Lord Chancellor on notice of yet another judicial review. In that letter, a 
required first step for the issue of legal proceedings, the Law Society said 
that the proposals were tantamount to ―selling justice‖ and so contrary to 
the principles of Magna Carta. The President of that body expatiated on 
that proposition in a public statement saying ―The policy on enhanced 
court fees amount to a flat tax on those seeking justice‖ they ―will price 
the public out of the Courts and keep small business saddled with debts 
they are due but unable to recover. State provision for people to redress 
wrongs through the Courts is the hallmark of a civilized society‖. To 
which the Ministry of Justice responded by saying that it is not litigants 
but that a segment of our community so much beloved of politicians
197
 
―the hard working taxpayers‖ who had up to now had to pick up some of 
the bill. 
This clash of ideologies will not, however fall to be resolved in the 
Courts after all. Judicial review is of course a discretionary remedy. But in 
this instance discretion proved the better part of valour. Despite the 
indicative precedent of R v Lord Chancellor ex p Witham
198
 where an 
order repealing provisions which gave poor litigants exemption from a 
reduction in court fees was held unconstitutional as a denial of access to 
the Court, and apparently on the advice of leading Counsel, the Law 
Society announced on 8
th
 April 2015 ―that it did not intend to pursue the 
litigation route.‖199 This did not, however mean their spokesman said, 
―that we are giving up. Far from it, our relentless lobbying has led the 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats stating that they will review the court 
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fee increase if they are part of a new government.‖ ―If‖ may be the 
operative word.
200
 
So I would not seek to dispute the proposition that Magna Cartas 
significance is as mythic document rather than as a legal text. Nonetheless 
the text is not trivial. A submission made by David, (now) Lord Pannick 
QC, in the Chagos islands litigation that it was ―not an act of parliament201 
but some unspecified category of subordinate law‖,202 was withdrawn by 
him after, if not merely as a result of, an expression of judicial dismay by 
Laws LJ. 
Indeed rather than being classified as less than law, there is high 
authority that it is a category of superior law. In litigation in the Supreme 
Court over the paving legislation for HS2
203
 Lord Neugberger and Mance 
jointly stated ―The United Kingdom has no written constitution but we 
have a number of constitutional instruments. They include Magna 
Carta.‖204 Theirs is merely one of many statements to the same effect, 
some of which I have already quoted.
205
  
I stress, however, that one should not be beguiled by such encomia 
into classifying Magna Carta as a constitution in the sense that we usually 
ascribe to that concept: that is to say, a superior legal norm against which 
even legislation, enacted by a democratic legislature, fails to be tested and, 
if found wanting, to be invalidated, of which the Constitution of the USA 
is the best known, but by no means the only example. 
It does not even enjoy the level of potency of the Human Rights Act 
which entitles the judges, where legislation offends against its provisions, 
to make a declaration of incompatibility,
206
 requiring in fact if not in form 
the enactment of amending legislation to ensure such compliance. At its 
highest it supplies presumptions that liberty or property is not to be 
                                                     
200
 And so indeed it proved to be. Both parties have been since the General 
Election in opposition. 
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 R (on the application of Bancoult) (n 131) 1073 F-G. 
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 Ibid [32] (Laws LJ) for the interpretation of his submissions. See too A-G’s 
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 See too In Re S-C (n 113) 534 (Bingham MR): 
‗As we are all well aware, no adult citizen of the United Kingdom is liable to be 
confined in any institution against his will, save by the authority of law. This is a. 
fundamental constitutional principle, traceable back to chapter 29 of Magna Carta 
1297…‘ 
206
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interfered with other than by clear colour of law
207
 and is immune itself to 
implied repeal by later legislation.
208
 
 
MAGNA CARTA - MYTH?  
 
So myth it chiefly is, but I stress too that myth can sometimes be as 
potent as reality in shaping history. Lord Sumption puts the proposition 
pithily ―Some legislation has a symbolic significance quite distinct from 
any principles it actually articulates.‖  
It is often the interpretation given to words rather than their literal 
meaning which can be decisive in shaping human action; in our times the 
diverse treatment of the Koran perfectly illustrates the point. 
As Laws LJ said in the Chagos islander‘s case ―Magna Carta is in 
truth the first genuine declaration in the long history of our constitutional 
jurisprudence of the principle of the rule of law that describes the 
enduring significance of Magna Carta today.‖209 
If it has survived Cromwell‘s vulgar pun – he called it Magna Farta – 
it can surely survive Dr Starkey‘s observation that it contained ―a lot of 
guff.‖210 Magna Carta was as important for what it was as for what it said. 
The barons may not have been fully fledged democrats, but they did corral 
the King. 
We should not mourn that it has survived only in an abbreviated form 
and with diminishing impact on the development of our jurisprudence. We 
should marvel that, eight centuries on, it has survived at all. Let me leave 
the penultimate word with Lord Judge and Mr Arlidge:  
 
The perception of what the charter stood for became as important 
as the actual language of the original clauses. In this country we 
now take for granted that laws should not be handed down by 
government diktat and that the community should be involved in 
its creation; that those in authority are subject to the rule of law 
                                                     
207 See Jaroo v A-G of Trinidad and Tobago [2002] UKPC 5, [2002] 1 A.C. 871 
[24] on its inspiration for the phrase ‗due process of law‘.  
208 Thorburn (n 170) [62] (Laws LJ). 
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http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/law/article4365364.ece> accessed 21 August 2015. 
MAGNA CARTA IN THE TWENTIETH AND TWENTY FIRST 
CENTURIES 
 
44 
and that the rights of the citizen should be protected by the 
efficient administration of justice.
211
  
 
Or as I would put it in a single sentence: it is because of Magna Carta 
that we can truthfully say that in our society the immortal principle is that 
―no one – the king or lawmaker is above the law‖,212 that we are governed 
by laws and not by men.  
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212 Halsbury‘s Laws (5th edn, 2010) vol 88A, para 1 
